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Church and State in the United States:
Competing Conceptions and Historic Changes
DOUGLAS LAYCOCK*
ABSTRACT
This article, originally written for a French audience, attempts to explain the
American law of church and state from the ground up, assuming no background in-
formation. Basic legal provisions are explained. The relevant American history is pe-
riodized in three alignments of religious conflict: Protestant-Protestant, Protestant-
Catholic, and religious-secular. Some frequently heard concepts are explained, distin-
guished, and related to each other-separation, voluntarism, equality, formal and
substantive neutrality, liberty, toleration, and state action. Finally, the principal dis-
putes over religious liberty are assessed in three broad areas-funding of religiously
affiliated activities, religious speech (with and without government sponsorship), and
regulation of religious practice. These disputes are reviewed in historical, political,
and doctrinal terms, with brief comparisons to the substantially different French solu-
tions to the same problems.
This article, originally written for a French audience and published in
French,' attempts to explain the American law of church and state from the
ground up, assuming no background information of any kind. That turned out
to be a useful exercise; explaining the underlying assumptions we generally take
for granted revealed insights and connections previously overlooked. I hope
English-speaking readers will also find it useful.
Except for rewriting the introduction and updating the treatment of the
most recent developments, I have changed very little from the version I submit-
ted to the French translators. I retain the comparisons of what I know in depth
on the American side to what I think I understand superficially on the French
side. I am pleased to report that my cautious observations on French law in this
*Alice McKean Young Regents Chair, The University of Texas School of Law. J.D. 1973,
University of Chicago; B.A. 1970, Michigan State University.
1. Douglas Laycock, La religion et 1' !tat aux t tats-Unis: affrontement des th6ories et changements
historiques, in LA CONCEPTION AMIERICAINE DE LA LAICIT 35 (Elisabeth Zoller ed., 2005). I know
what I said in English; I have to take the French translation as a matter of faith.
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article passed through the hands of French editors without provoking argument
or corrections. But no reader should make the mistake of thinking me an expert
on the French system.
It is revealing to compare how two modern democratic societies, each pro-
claiming its commitment to liberty and equality, have come to fundamentally
different resolutions of these issues on nearly every point. France and the United
States share a commitment to religious liberty. But different histories and differ-
ent distributions of religious opinion have led to different understandings of
what religious liberty means in practice.
The one-word label for the French system is laIcit ; American scholars were
invited to Paris to explain the American conception of laicit6. But I am not sure
there is a relevant American conception of laYcit& To fully understand laifcit6, I
suspect that one must be immersed in French law and French social and political
practice. In French-English dictionaries, laYcit6 is often omitted; when it ap-
pears, it is commonly translated as "secularism." This is probably a simplifica-
tion, but let us accept it as a starting point. Many Americans would say that the
United States has a secular government, or that it aspires to have a secular gov-
ernment. A minority of Americans would like to see a wholly secular society.
But no one in the United States would use a word like "secularism" to summa-
rize the American understanding of church-state relations.
There is no widely accepted single word to summarize the American sys-
tem. Several such words have been suggested, but none of them is universally ac-
cepted. Probably the nearest equivalent in American usage is "separation of
church and state," often shortened to "separation." This is a troublesome phrase
even before translation; Americans dispute its meaning, and even dispute
whether it describes one of our governing principles. But separation of church
and state is probably the most common phrase for summarizing American
church-state relations; again, let us accept it as a starting point.
Separation of church and state requires that government be separated from
religion, and thus that government itself be secular. Separation means that gov-
ernment is not to sponsor religion, and also, although this point gets less empha-
sis in the rhetoric of separation, government is not to interfere with religion.
Many religious believers support separation in part because they believe that re-
ligion will flourish best without government sponsorship, and that all sponsor-
ship is a form of interference. So separation need not lead to secularism in civil
society. To the contrary, many Americans believe that separation is one impor-
tant reason why religious faith persists in the United States to a far greater extent
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than in most other industrialized democracies. Separation does not imply that
religion is best kept out of public view, or even that private religious expression
should be kept out of government institutions. I do not know the French system
well enough to be sure, but I think that any correspondence between separation
and la'icit6 is very inexact.
Other attempts to summarize the American system are that religion must be
voluntary, and that government must be neutral as between religions and as be-
tween religion and religious disbelief. Each of these principles has applications
that are highly controversial in the United States. Americans dispute the meaning
of neutrality just as they dispute the meaning of separation. And of course, all such
explanations are mere paraphrases of the operative language of the numerous
constitutional and statutory provisions protecting religious liberty.
There may be no simple explanations of our system to citizens familiar with
the French system, and no clearly equivalent words or phrases in our two lan-
guages for the central concepts. My only course is to explain the American system
as simply and clearly as I can, with emphasis on answers to specific practical ques-
tions. I will necessarily have to generalize in places and omit important variations.
Keep in mind that on many important issues of religious liberty, there are at
least two sides in the United States, with intense and sustained political and legal
conflict. Our adversarial legal system, and our active system of judicial review of
the constitutional validity of government practices, often enable the opposing
sides in political and even religious arguments to translate their claims into legal
arguments. At different times in American history, very different understand-
ings of religious liberty have prevailed. The American conception of church-
state relations is disputed, and it changes over time.
I. THE BASIC LEGAL PROVISIONS
The United States has many constitutional and statutory guarantees of reli-
gious liberty. Most important are two sentences in the Constitution of the United
States. The first is the Test Oath Clause, in Article VI, clause 3, which provides:
"[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or
public Trust under the United States." England had historically required office
holders to swear an oath that they believed in essential doctrines of the Church
of England, or of Protestantism more generally; several of the early American
states had similar provisions. The Test Oath Clause prohibits any such require-
ment for federal office holders. Persons of any faith or of none may freely com-
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pete for federal office and hold the office if selected. But nothing prevents voters
from considering religion when they vote, and nothing prevents the president
from considering religion when he makes political appointments.
The more famous provision appears in the First Amendment to the Consti-
tution: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof." "Establishment" is a word that may not
translate very well. I believe it is a cognate, and that in its general sense it means
roughly the same thing in French and English. But as applied to religion, "estab-
lish" and "establishment" have a special sense in English. Early in the sixteenth
century, King Henry VIII of England rejected the authority of the Pope, seized
control of the structure and property of the Catholic Church in England, and
had his Parliament enact a law making the King the head of the church. Later
English legislation referred to this new church as "the Church of England by
law established." From this statutory phrase came a new English usage: An es-
tablished church, or an established religion, is one supported and sponsored by
the government.
To say that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion" is thus to say that Congress shall not support or sponsor religion. This pro-
vision is commonly called the Establishment Clause. To say that Congress shall
make no law "prohibiting the free exercise" of religion is more straightforward;
Congress shall not prevent churches or individuals from exercising, or actively
practicing, the religion of their choice. This provision is commonly called the Free
Exercise Clause. The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses together are called
the Religion Clauses.
By their terms, these guarantees apply only to federal offices and to the fed-
eral Congress. But constitutional amendments after the American Civil War
(1861-65) are now understood to equally protect these rights from interference
by state and local governments. This is called "incorporation"; the early consti-
tutional provisions protecting rights against the federal government are said to
be "incorporated" into the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects rights
against states and against local governments, which are created by states. So the
Test Oath Clause, the Establishment Clause, and the Free Exercise Clause are
now fully applicable to state and local governments. 2
In addition, even before the Civil War, states guaranteed religious liberty in
their own constitutions. (American states have much more autonomy than
2. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
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French provinces, and before the Civil War, states had far more autonomy than
they do now. Each state has its own constitution and its own bill of rights.) These
state constitutional provisions tend to be more detailed than the federal provi-
sions. They are generally, but not always, similar in meaning.
Increasingly in recent years, there are state and federal statutes to protect re-
ligious liberty. Many of these statutes exempt religious practices from govern-
ment regulation; they attempt to protect religious practice more effectively than
the federal Free Exercise Clause.
The American legal system relies heavily on judicial precedent arising from
the decision of individual cases. So these constitutional and statutory provisions
are repeatedly interpreted by courts. In a process based on common law meth-
ods, these judicial opinions themselves become part of the law. The differences
between state and federal Religion Clauses, or between statutes and the federal
Free Exercise Clause, are only partly reflected in different constitutional and
statutory text. To a great extent, these differences have emerged as differences in
judicial interpretation. Judicial interpretation can change over time, in response
to legal, political, social, or even religious developments. Judges can modify or
overrule earlier judicial opinions; legislatures can amend the text of statutes.
Constitutions can also be amended, but that is much more difficult.
II. SOME ESSENTIAL HISTORY: THREE ALIGNMENTS OF RELIGIOUS CONFLICT
A. Protestant-Protestant Conflict: The Founding and Its Consequences
The United States never had a dominant national church that exercised
great power and provoked great reaction. No church in the United States has
ever occupied anything like the place of the Catholic Church in France.
The story of church-state relations in the United States begins with the thir-
teen English colonies that later became the thirteen original states. Most of these
colonies had an established church-a church sponsored and supported by the
colonial government. In each case, the established church was a particular Prot-
estant denomination.
The Church of England was established in five southern colonies and in
parts of New York. In three New England colonies, the established church was
chosen by local elections, which were nearly always won by the Congregational
Church (the eighteenth-century descendants of the Puritans). These established
churches did not have centuries of accumulated wealth. They did have a domi-
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nant social and political position; they were supported by taxes collected by the
government; and they provoked substantial resentment. But their story has a
very different ending from the story of the Catholic Church in France.
The dominant regional position of these two established churches was
threatened by continued immigration of Protestants of many denominations.
Members of the churches that were not established were called "dissenters," be-
cause they dissented from the teachings of the established church. Beginning in
the 1740s, Baptists, Presbyterians, and other dissenters greatly increased their
numbers in a surge of religious enthusiasm known as "The Great Awakening."
Members of these dissenting churches were evangelical Protestants, more en-
thusiastic and less formal in their worship than the established churches, and
more intense in their faith. They were the direct religious ancestors of the evan-
gelical movement in the United States today.
In the wake of the American Revolution, each state and the new federal
government wrote a constitution. The evangelical dissenters insisted that these
new constitutions address issues of religious liberty. Immediately in most states,
eventually in all states, the established churches were disestablished-deprived
of government sponsorship and deprived of tax support. The details varied from
state to state, but disestablishment was not the work of secular revolutionaries. It
was mostly the work of evangelical religious dissenters.
In the free competition for religious adherents that followed, the formerly
established churches did not fare well. The Congregational Church and the
Episcopal Church (the new name for what was formerly the American branch
of the Church of England), today retain a membership that is affluent and polit-
ically influential but small in numbers. Together, these formerly established
churches are now only 2.4 percent of the population.3 The remaining 97.6 per-
cent include a remarkable diversity of other Christian denominations and also a
diverse array of non-Christian faiths, nonbelievers, and other secularists.
The dominant issue in the founding-era debate over disestablishment was
government financial support for churches. Churches that received tax support
did not want to give it up; many citizens, and especially dissenters and the un-
churched, did not want to pay the taxes. Defenders of the established churches
proposed as a compromise that dissenters be allowed to pay their church tax to
3. See BARRY A. KOSMIN, EGON MAYER & ARIELA KEYSAR, AMERICAN RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICA-
TION SURVEY 2001, at 12 exh.1 (2001), available at http'//www.gc.cuny.edu/faculty/research-
studies/aris.pdf.
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their own church, so that tax money would be equally available to all denomina-
tions. But in the end, every state rejected this compromise. This high-profile de-
bate over tax support for churches has played a large role in the development of
American understandings of religious liberty.
B. Protestant-Catholic Conflict: The Nineteenth and Early-Twentieth Centuries
The Catholic Church had a very small presence in the English colonies that
became the United States. Even so, Americans inherited a fear of Catholicism
from the English experience of Protestant-Catholic conflict. Beginning in the
second quarter of the nineteenth century, and continuing until World War I,
there was massive Catholic immigration to the United States, resulting in seri-
ous Protestant-Catholic conflict. This conflict raised two principal issues, closely
related but distinct.
Both issues grew out of the treatment of religion in the public schools. Pub-
lic schools in the United States are organized and operated by local governments
and funded by state and local taxes; only since the 1960s has there been modest
financial aid from the federal government. Creation of public schools was
mostly a nineteenth-century development, largely coinciding with the Catholic
immigration.
Most of these public schools in the nineteenth century attempted to teach the
Bible and the basic principles of Christianity, and to do so in a way that avoided
disagreements among Christian denominations. They did not wholly succeed in
avoiding disagreements among Protestants, but Protestants suppressed their
disagreements in the face of what they viewed as the Catholic threat. From a
Catholic perspective, the religious teaching in the schools was clearly Protestant
in its scriptural translations, in its ritual practices, and in its theological presup-
positions.
Catholics responded with two demands. One was to eliminate Protestant
teaching in the public schools; the other was that government pay for privately
run Catholic schools. In the Catholic view, they were simply demanding equal-
ity. Government paid for public schools that were Protestant; it should also pay
for schools that were Catholic.
Protestants denied that the public schools were Protestant. They said that
the religious exercises in the public schools were "nonsectarian," by which they
meant neutral as among Christians, but that Catholic schools were "sectarian,"
teaching the doctrines of a particular sect. Protestants also refused to provide
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government funding for the small number of schools run by Protestant denom-
inations; these schools too were sectarian. But everyone understood that Catholics
were the principal target of this distinction between sectarian and nonsectarian
schools.
Protestants argued that the principle from the founding-that government
should not financially support churches-also meant that government should
not financially support sectarian schools. Applying this principle to schools was
in fact a significant extension. Catholic schools taught religion, but they also
taught reading, writing, mathematics, and other secular subjects. Government
could have paid for instruction in secular subjects and let the church add its own
funds to pay for religious instruction. But Protestants were numerically domi-
nant, so solutions that would permit partial funding of Catholic schools were not
seriously considered. Moreover, political parties found it in their interest to agi-
tate this issue from time to time. A majority of state constitutions were amended
to forbid government financial support for sectarian schools; in 1876, a similar
proposed amendment to the federal Constitution was narrowly defeated in
Congress.
There was also a large Jewish immigration to the United States in the late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Of course, Jewish students also ob-
jected to Christian religious instruction in the public schools. The Jewish com-
munity's principal response, then and now, was to urge that the public schools be
secularized. Most American Jews did not start their own schools, and those who
did start schools did not seek government financial support.
World War I cut off the great flow of European immigration, and after the
war, the United States restricted its resumption. Each succeeding generation of
Catholics and Jews were more assimilated than their parents, and Protestant-
Catholic tension gradually eased. In 1960, John Kennedy was the first Catholic
to be elected president, and he and his family were personally attractive and
widely popular. Shortly thereafter, the Second Vatican Council committed the
Catholic Church to freedom of conscience. After these two events, lingering
anti-Catholicism in the United States collapsed with remarkable speed. Even
earlier, in 1955, a well-received book argued that Protestants, Catholics, and
Jews were three great branches of a common civil religion in the United States.4
4. WILL HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEw: AN ESSAY IN AMERICAN RELIGIOUS SOCIOLOGY
(1955).
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C. Religious-Secular and Left-Right Conflict: The Late-Twentieth Century and
Today
Other fault lines were emerging even as Protestant-Catholic conflict dwin-
dled. The 1960s were a decade of great social change in the United States and
elsewhere. The civil rights movement, the antiwar movement, and the sexual
revolution were concentrated in the 1960s. There were race riots in many
American cities. The Supreme Court delivered libertarian decisions expanding
the rights of free speech, of religious and racial minorities, and of criminal de-
fendants. In 1973, the Court announced a constitutional right to abortion.
5
These developments provoked a backlash, and part of that backlash was re-
ligious. Culturally conservative religious believers of all faiths-evangelical
Protestants, conservative Catholics, Orthodox Jews-resisted the sexual revolu-
tion, the general attitude of permissiveness, and the sense of social disorder asso-
ciated with demonstrations, crime, and riots; they were especially horrified by
the right to abortion. What came to be known as the Religious Right is part of
the political coalition that has elected a series of increasingly conservative
American presidents, beginning with Ronald Reagan in 1980.
This backlash had consequences for competing views of religious liberty.
For most of American history, the most theologically conservative Protestants
had been the most anti-Catholic, and therefore, evangelical Protestants had been
among the most vigorous opponents of government funding for religious
schools. But beginning in the 1960s, these conservative Protestants began build-
ing religious schools of their own. This movement began in response to racial
desegregation in the public schools, but that issue eventually faded. Conserva-
tive Protestant schools have grown dramatically in numbers and show every
sign of permanence, sustained by parents who view the public schools as secular-
ized and hostile to religious faith.
At first the leaders of these Protestant schools were more concerned with
avoiding government regulation than with attracting government funding. But
after the regulatory issues were mostly resolved, parents in these schools increas-
ingly resented paying taxes for public schools they felt they could not use, while
also paying the full cost of creating a private alternative. Their situation was ex-
actly that of Catholic parents a century before. And in the 1980s, evangelical
Protestants changed their minds about government funding for religious
5. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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schools. Since then, government funding for private schools has drawn the sup-
port of a coalition of Catholics, evangelical Protestants, secular conservatives
arguing the benefits of competition in a free market, and a minority of black
parents seeking alternatives to inner-city public schools that are often of low
quality. As we shall see, the Supreme Court has responded; it has changed its in-
terpretation of constitutional law about funding religious schools.
In the 1980s and later, the religious division in the United States began to look
more parallel to the historic religious division in France, with intense believers ar-
rayed against secularists.6 But each side is a diverse coalition, difficult to accurately
summarize. Both sides include people of many different faiths; the United States
is further than ever from having a single dominant church. On one side are in-
tensely religious, culturally conservative believers of all faiths. Conservative Prot-
estants, Catholics, and Jews often find they have more in common with each other
than with liberal adherents of their own religious tradition. These religious con-
servatives make effective alliances with secular conservatives in electoral politics
and on issues of mutual interest. Occasionally, Muslims join in this coalition of the
religiously conservative, but that collaboration was never well developed, and the
tensions growing out of terrorist attacks and the invasion of Iraq have made
Christian-Muslim cooperation more difficult for both sides.
On the left is a small but increasingly vocal population of nonbelievers, a
large group of serious religious believers who are politically and theologically
liberal, and a large group that I will call nominal believers. In opinion polls, 95
percent of Americans say they believe in "God or a universal Spirit." But many
of those 95 percent rarely attend church and appear to act on a thoroughly natu-
ralistic worldview in their daily life. This is the group I am calling "nominal be-
lievers"; for them, God appears to be a very remote being, a metaphor, or
perhaps a polite fiction. The religious affiliations of these liberal believers and
nominal believers also cross the traditional divides among Protestants, Catho-
lics, and Jews.
There has emerged among this secular and religious-left coalition a new
form of anti-Catholicism. Historic anti-Catholicism in the United States was
based in Protestantism, in theological disagreements, and in hostility to the pa-
pacy. This historic Protestant anti-Catholicism is now confined to a barely
6. See generally JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA
(1991); PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, REASON IN THE BALANCE: THE CASE AGAINST NATURALISM IN SCIENCE,
LAW & EDUCATION (1995).
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visible fringe. The new anti-Catholicism is based on resentment of the Church's
efforts to enact certain Catholic moral teachings into law-especially on sexual
behavior and abortion-and it is just as hostile to conservative Protestants as it is
to conservative Catholics.
There are many smaller religious groups that do not neatly fit on either side
of the main line of religious conflict. The United States once again has high im-
migration rates, and most of this immigration comes from places outside
Europe. Many of these immigrants are Christian, but in the United States, they
are so far distinguished more by their ethnic identity than by their religious
identity. Many are Muslim; some are Buddhist, Hindu, or adherents of smaller
religions from around the world.
Unusual variations of Christianity and Judaism have survived and some-
times flourished in the United States. A few of these preserve nineteenth-
century lifestyles (the Amish, for example); some are highly insular communities
with unusual dress and customs (Hasidic Jews, for example); some live in quite
conventional ways but have distinctive theologies (the Mormons, for example).
There are groups such as the Hare Krishnas, the Scientologists, and the Unifica-
tion Church, pejoratively called "cults" and euphemistically called "New Reli-
gious Movements." Perhaps a more neutral description is that they seem very
strange to most Americans and they make high demands on their members.
These unusual religious groups, including the recent immigrants, produce a
greatly disproportionate share of litigation about the free exercise of religion.
The more mainstream groups, on either side of the division between religious
conservatives and secularized liberals, produce most of the litigation about gov-
ernment support for religion.
7
III. SOME FREQUENTLY HEARD CONCEPTS
There have been many attempts to capture the essence of the American un-
derstanding of religious liberty in a word or a phrase. Some of these efforts have
been used as political slogans; most of them have been analyzed and elaborated
by academics. But there is no authoritative definition of these concepts, and no
authoritative hierarchy among them, because the Supreme Court has not used
them in any systematic way.
7. For a more detailed account of the constitutional effects of religious change, see John C. Jef-
fries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political Hijstoy of the Establishment Clause, 100 Mict. L. REv. 279
(2001).
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These phrases appear in Supreme Court opinions when convenient or help-
ful, and the Court has given some of them inconsistent meanings over time.
These words indicate broad approaches rather than precise principles for deduc-
tive reasoning, and on many issues, each side tries to claim that its position is
consistent with most of these approaches. Some of these terms attempt to distin-
guish conflicting positions, but many of them describe different aspects of the
same reality. Do not exaggerate the importance of these terms. Still, I think it
useful to introduce them before turning to more specific controversies.
A. Separation
Separation of church and state has a range of meanings.8 The narrowest
meaning is institutional separation: Nearly all Americans agree that the institu-
tions of the church should be separate from the institutions of the state. By general
law the state provides legal structures under which churches can organize them-
selves; most churches are not-for-profit corporations, but some have trustees to
hold their property, and some are unincorporated associations. Any church can
organize itself under these structures; no form of license or advance permission is
required, and the state has no voice in deciding which churches can exist, in ap-
pointing church personnel, or in developing religious doctrine. Conversely, no
governmental powers can be delegated to a religious organization.
9
Perhaps the most fundamental point of separation is that questions of reli-
gion are separated from the coercive power of government. Government cannot
use its coercive power to support or oppose religion, either on its own initiative
or at the request of a church.
Financial separation was established at the founding. Government does not
financially support churches, and churches generally do not pay taxes. Church
tax exemption is a legislative policy; it is constitutionally permitted"' but not con-
stitutionally required." The remaining controversy over government financial
support concerns whether and to what extent the ban on financial support ap-
plies to religious schools and social service providers.
8. Douglas Laycock, The Many Meanings of Separation, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1667 (2003) (review-
ing PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002)).
9. See Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994); Larkin v. Grendel' s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116
(1982).
10. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
11. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990).
CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES
The most intense controversies are about the extent to which government
functions must be separated from religious observance and ritual. For example,
can government meetings open with prayer?
A longstanding minority in the United States interprets separation in a way
that seeks to minimize the influence of religion. This minority sees any influ-
ence of religion on government as a contact that violates separation; they would
exclude religious meetings from public places and religious arguments from po-
litical debate. This view has never attracted a majority of the Supreme Court; it
is not a mainstream meaning of separation. But neither does it fade away.
B. Voluntarism
Nearly all Americans believe that religious belief and activity should be vol-
untary, and thus that government should not coerce it. A majority of the Su-
preme Court, and a minority of public opinion, believe that government should
not encourage or discourage religious belief or practice even if it refrains from
coercion. Voluntarism is closely related to separation. Separation is the more
common phrase, but voluntarism is the older of the two ideas.
The dissenting Protestants in the founding era insisted on voluntarism as
part of their attack on the established church. It is obvious why voluntarism ap-
peals to dissenters and nonbelievers; if one does not wish to go to church (or to
the established church), it is important for the state to recognize that religion
should be voluntary. Less obviously, the idea of voluntarism originated with de-
vout Protestants who concluded that coerced religious faith is ineffectual, so that
it did no good to coerce people into church attendance. The religious rationale
for voluntarism is that only voluntary religious commitments can please God or
save souls.
C. Equality
The legal equality of all faiths was settled in the founding era, as a corollary
of disestablishment. The established church was deprived of its preferred status,
and all churches were guaranteed the same liberties. Those who accomplished
this change were thinking mostly of the different Protestant denominations, but
the principle has been extended to Catholics, Jews, and all the remarkably di-
verse faiths that have since appeared in the United States. In principle, and to a
great extent in practice, this equal status for all faiths includes those high-
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demand religions that have drawn special regulation in some other countries,
such as the Hare Krishnas and Scientologists. These small and unusual religions
have the same rights as any other religious group. These groups have encoun-
tered some legal difficulties, mostly in the form of private lawsuits initiated by
disgruntled former members, but they are not subject to any special regulation
or supervision.
D. Neutrality
Religious neutrality is the appropriate government response to religious
equality. The Supreme Court says that government should be neutral as be-
tween religious faiths, and that it should be neutral as between religion and reli-
gious disbelief. (The Court's usual phrase is neutral between "religion and
nonreligion," but I think that "religious disbelief" better explains what the
Court means by nonreligion.) There is very broad support for these propositions
with respect to the coercive powers of government; Americans overwhelmingly
agree that government should not penalize either believers or nonbelievers.
There is more controversy about neutrality with respect to government sub-
sidies. Some Americans oppose any subsidy to any organization with a religious
affiliation. Other Americans support subsidies to religious schools or social ser-
vice providers, but tend to think that subsidies should be confined to religions
that are not too different from their own. The Supreme Court's position is that
subsidies to religious organizations are sometimes forbidden, but that when they
are permitted, they must be equally available to all faiths, however unfamiliar.
The most controversial application of the Supreme Court's neutrality prin-
ciple is to government expressions of opinion. The Court often says that govern-
ment should express no views on religious questions-it should express no
preference as between different faiths or between religion and religious disbe-
lief. This rule is settled law with narrow exceptions, but a majority of Americans
are unpersuaded.
Neutrality has also generated substantial arguments about what it means to
be neutral. The Supreme Court usually speaks of neutrality without specifying
a definition, and sometimes it shifts from one meaning to the other. Two princi-
pal meanings have been recognized.'
2
12. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 559-64 (1993)
(Souter, J., concurring).
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1. Formal Neutrality
Formal neutrality means government that is blind to religious differences.
A law is formally neutral if it makes no distinctions on the basis of religion. Such
a law applies equally to religious institutions and secular institutions, and it ap-
plies equally to the same conduct whether that conduct was done for religious
reasons or secular reasons.
2. Substantive Neutrality
Substantive neutrality means that government seeks to govern in such a way
that it neither encourages nor discourages religious belief or practice. Sometimes
formal neutrality is also substantively neutral: If secular and religious speakers
have equal rights to speak in the city park, government will treat them exactly
the same (formal neutrality) and no one will be encouraged to make his message
more or less religious (substantive neutrality). But supporters of substantive neu-
trality believe that, sometimes, neutrality requires government to take account
of religious differences. A law that prohibits sex discrimination in employment,
in most of its applications, regulates an unfair employment practice that has little
or no commercial justification. But as applied to the employment of Catholic
priests or Orthodox Jewish rabbis, such a law prohibits a religious practice,
strongly discouraging that practice with threats of legal penalties. Exempting
the employment of clergy permits the religious practice to continue, but it does
not encourage anyone to become Catholic or to become an Orthodox Jew, nor
does it encourage other churches to stop ordaining and employing women
clergy. Exempting the religious practice may be more neutral in its effects than
regulating religious and secular practices equally.
E. Liberty
Some American commentators say that the fundamental point of religious
liberty is liberty, and that all the other concepts I have mentioned are instrumen-
tal at most, distractions at worst. The goal of guaranteeing religious liberty is to
ensure that each American has as much liberty as possible to choose and act on
his own religious commitments or his own rejection of religion. And some
would say that we should pose that question directly-that the Court should
seek to maximize religious liberty rather than separation, voluntarism, equality,
or neutrality.
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F Toleration
In the early years in some American colonies, as in Europe at the same time,
the established church suppressed all other churches. This suppression of other
faiths gave way to "toleration," in which one church was established and others
were tolerated. "Toleration" implied subordinate status and toleration by the
grace of the established church; these connotations soon became unacceptable.
Disestablishment and the equality of all faiths marked the end of toleration as an
acceptable account of religious liberty, and the word fell into disuse. In 1689,
England's "Toleration Act" guaranteed toleration to all Protestants; a century
later, America's First Amendment guaranteed "free exercise" of religion to all
faiths, without limitation to Protestants. Although the word "toleration" is no
longer used, we shall see that the idea lingers in disputes over government ex-
pression of religious opinion.
G. State Action
State action is a general constitutional concept, not specific to religious lib-
erty, but it has special relevance to religious liberty. American constitutions cre-
ate and regulate the branches of government, defining the powers of each.
Constitutional rights limit what the government can do to the people; these
rights do not limit what the people can do to the government, or to each other.
Constitutional rights apply only to actions done by the government, or by some-
one exercising governmental authority; the usual phrase is that constitutional
rights protect only against state action.
It is sometimes said that separation of church and state prevents churches
from taking over the government, or even from unduly influencing the govern-
ment. But the state action requirement means that the Constitution does not re-
strict the efforts of churches or religious individuals to influence the
government. The Constitution applies only when the government itself takes
action, whether on its own initiative or at the request of a church. Moreover,
state action is the difference between protected free exercise and prohibited es-
tablishment. Religious conduct by private citizens is free exercise of religion; re-
ligious conduct by government is, in most cases, an establishment of religion.
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IV. PRINCIPAL DISPUTES OVER THE MEANING OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
Three great sets of practical issues produce persistent controversy over the
meaning of religious liberty in the United States. Two of these controversies
grow directly out of the nineteenth-century Protestant-Catholic conflict over
schools: funding of religious schools, now generalized to funding of any reli-
giously affiliated activity, and religious observances in public schools, now gen-
eralized to all religious speech with government sponsorship. The third great
controversy, less publicized but in my view more fundamental, concerns regula-
tion of religious practice. Organized interest groups on both sides support law-
suits seeking to advance their views on each of these disputed issues, so there is a
remarkable volume of litigation. I will try to keep jargon to a minimum, but it is
impossible to explain legal developments in the United States without reference
to the names of cases.
A. Funding of Religiously Affiliated Activities
The founding-era principle that government should not directly fund the re-
ligious functions of churches has survived with little disagreement for more than
two hundred years. The nineteenth-century controversy over the funding of reli-
gious schools has continued unabated to the present, and is actually expanding in
scope. To the extent that any funding is permitted, it is subject to the principle of
equality of all faiths; government money must be available on equal terms to all.
These settled principles-that government should not fund churches and that
any funding of other religious organizations must be distributed on equal
terms-distinguish the United States from much of Western Europe.
The political fight over government money for religious schools continued
for more than a century before it reached the Supreme Court. In most places the
opponents of funding won politically, so there were no funding programs to
challenge in court. And it was not plausible to file a lawsuit challenging the ab-
sence of such programs; no one thought that government might be required to
fund religious schools.
In the mid-twentieth century, as Protestant-Catholic conflict declined, a few
states and localities began to enact modest programs of aid to private schools.
Then in the 1960s, economic and social forces-especially the decline of central
cities-threw the Catholic school system into financial crisis. Public education
officials feared that Catholic schools might close in large numbers, returning
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many thousands of students to the public schools and causing a financial crisis
there. The states most affected began searching for ways to give money to pri-
vate schools, and the pace of litigation greatly accelerated.
The relevant law has changed dramatically over time as the Supreme Court
responded first to one, then to the other, of two conflicting principles. In 1947,
the Court announced these conflicting principles in consecutive paragraphs in
the first modern Establishment Clause case, Everson v. Board of Education.' On
one hand was the no-aid principle: "No tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be
called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion."' 4 On the
other was the nondiscrimination principle: Government "cannot exclude indi-
vidual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-
believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, because of their faith,
or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation."'"
In the beginning, these two principles had been consistent. The eighteenth-
century debates involved earmarked taxes levied exclusively for the funding of
churches. In an era with few public welfare benefits, these taxes funded purely
religious programs and funded those programs preferentially. As applied to that
dispute, the no-aid and nondiscrimination principles did not conflict, and the
no-aid principle served religious liberty. No-aid protected citizens from being
forced to contribute to churches involuntarily; it protected the churches from fi-
nancial dependence on government, and thus from government control. It pre-
vented discrimination in favor of religion, and it did not discriminate against
religion. As I have said, there is still substantial consensus that government
should not fund the religious functions of churches.
The modern cases are very different. In all the modern cases, government is
funding some secular service-usually education, but sometimes medical care,
care of neglected children, or some other social service. Government offers the
money on equal terms to religious and secular providers alike. In that context,
the Court had to choose between its two principles. Either government money
would flow through to religious institutions, or students in religious schools, and
patients in religious hospitals, would forfeit instruction or services that the state
would have paid for if they had chosen a secular school or hospital.
13. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
14. Id. at 16.
15. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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The nondiscrimination principle prevailed in Everson, which upheld gov-
ernment-funded bus rides to a Catholic high school-but by a 5-4 vote. Two de-
cades later, the Court allowed states to provide secular textbooks for use in
religious schools."' Then the Court changed direction. In Lemon v. Kurtzman,'1
7
in 1971, the Court struck down a funding program for the first time, holding
that states could not subsidize teachers' salaries in religious schools. The no-aid
principle predominated from then until 1985.
But even in this period, the no-aid principle never completely triumphed. In-
stead, the Court made many fine distinctions. It permitted government support
for most religious colleges, 8 but restricted aid to religious elementary and second-
ary schools. In the elementary and secondary cases, the Court drew distinctions
that few observers would defend. The state could provide books, 9 but not maps;
2°
it could provide bus rides to school, 2 but not bus rides to field trips. 22 Perhaps most
absurd, the Court prohibited government-funded remedial instruction to low-
income students in religious schools, 23 but permitted that same instruction in vans
parked nearby.24 The cost of vans, and of dressing children to go back and forth in
all weather between the school building and the vans, was a deadweight economic
and educational loss, with benefits that were at most symbolic. This symbolism ir-
ritated the supporters of religious schools and completely failed to satisfy the ob-
jections of those who thought there should be no funding at all.
Few justices really believed in these awkward distinctions. They emerged in
part because the Supreme Court has nine justices who cast independent votes
and often have difficulty agreeing.25 Some justices opposed nearly all aid to reli-
16. Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
17. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
18. See Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973);
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
19. Allen, 392 U.S. 236.
20. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 362-66 (1975), overruled in part by Mitchell v. Helms, 530
U.S. 793, 808 (2000) (plurality opinion with O'Connor, J., concurring in the overruling).
21. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
22. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 252-55 (1977), overruled in part by Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 808
(plurality opinion with O'Connor, J., concurring in the overruling).
23. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235-36
(1997).
24. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 244-48; Walker v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 46 F.3d 1449 (9th
Cir. 1995). Wolman has not been overruled on this point.
25. For analysis of why it is so difficult for the Court to render consistent decisions over time,
see Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REv. 802 (1982).
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gious schools; some justices would have permitted nearly all aid to religious
schools. And some justices searched for compromise, trying to permit some aid
but not too much. Some of these justices in the middle were unwilling to over-
rule the earlier cases, preferring instead to draw artificial distinctions. And some
of them were still trying to preserve each of the two competing principles of no-
aid and nondiscrimination.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, the case that prohibited state subsidies for teacher sala-
ries, is famous for announcing a three-part legal test that is often quoted but
rarely decisive. The Court said that for a statute to comply with the Establish-
ment Clause, three things must be true:
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second,
its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster "an exces-
sive government entanglement with religion." 6
This test embodies the conflict between the no-aid and nondiscrimination
principles. Its first two elements are taken almost verbatim from the Court's ear-
lier explanations of "wholesome neutrality" toward religion.27 Its second ele-
ment, prohibiting government actions that either advance or inhibit religion, is
a statement of substantive neutrality. But in practice, justices invoking the
Lemon test were much more concerned about government advancing religion
than about government inhibiting religion. Through the 1970s and early 1980s,
the Court struck down most new forms of financial aid to religious schools. The
Court used the second and third elements of the Lemon test to create a dilemma
for legislators: any aid diverted to religious uses advanced religion, and any gov-
ernment monitoring to prevent such diversion caused excessive entanglement.
The aid the Court permitted was generally said to be incapable of religious uses,
such as secular textbooks, standardized testing,28 and diagnostic services. 29 With
respect to the remedial instruction for low-income students, and other services
provided by government employees to students in religious schools, the Court
26. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664, 674 (1970)).
27. Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
28. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980); Wolman, 433 U.S.
at 238-4 1.
29. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 241-44.
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implausibly said that the government employees providing these services were
less likely to be drawn into religious discussions with the children if they were
isolated in vans instead of working in a classroom of the religious school.3"
Beginning in 1986, the Court progressively elevated the nondiscrimination
principle and subordinated the no-aid principle. Since 1986, the Court has up-
held six programs that permitted government funds to reach religious institu-
tions;31 it has invalidated none. Four decisions from the Lemon era have been
overruled in whole or in part.32 The most important of the new decisions is
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,3  which upheld vouchers that can be used to pay tu-
ition at any public or private school, including religious schools. These vouchers
represent a right to draw on government funds for the exclusive purpose of pay-
ing educational expenses. The government issues the vouchers to individual stu-
dents or their parents, who spend them at the school of their choice; the school
then redeems the vouchers and collects the government money. Zelman reasons
that the government is not responsible for any resulting benefit to religion. The
government supports the student; the student and his parents decide where to
spend the money, and there is no state action in their choice of a school. If they
choose a religious school, that is a private decision. The Court has also upheld
long-term loans of equipment to private schools, including religious schools, if
the equipment is distributed to all schools on the basis of enrollment.34
Lemon's ban on direct cash grants to religious institutions remains in effect.
And the Court would be much more cautious about programs in which the gov-
ernment exercises discretion in deciding which private schools get government
money. American law tends to presume that such discretion will be abused
where sensitive constitutional rights are at stake-that favored religions will get
money and minority religions will not. But at least in the school context, there is
30. Id. at 247.
31. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (school voucher program); Mitchell v.
Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (federal aid to state education agencies which goes, in part, to parochial
schools); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (public school teachers providing remedial educa-
tion in parochial schools); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (interpreters
for the deaf); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (grants for teenage sexuality counseling);
Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (state vocational rehab for the
blind).
32. See cases cited supra notes 20, 22, & 23. The fourth case is School District of Grand Rapids v.
Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), overruled in part by Agostini, 521 U.S. 203.
33. Zelman, 536 U.S. 639.
34. Mitchell, 530 U.S. 793.
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no reason for legislatures to authorize either direct cash grants or discretion in
distributing funds. They can deliver as much money as they are willing to spend
in the form of vouchers to students and their families.
The voucher decision means that a long political tradition of no government
aid to religious schools has given way to a constitutional rule that permits such aid
in essentially unlimited amounts, so long as certain formalities are observed. But
courts do not enact programs or appropriate funds; Zelman gives voucher sup-
porters only the chance to fight further battles in Congress and in the states. They
face a broad coalition of voucher opponents: church-state separationists, teachers'
unions and others who fear that resources will be diverted from public schools, fis-
cal conservatives who oppose new entitlements and the taxes to pay for them, and
suburban parents who fear that voucher programs will open suburban public
schools to low-income students who might be disruptive. No state has enacted a
general voucher program for all students in elementary and secondary schools.
Voucher programs remain mostly experimental and concentrated on low-income
students or students in schools that fail to meet educational standards.
Even these narrow programs are routinely challenged under the relevant
state constitution. Many state constitutions have detailed restrictions on finan-
cial aid to sectarian schools. Some state courts have upheld such programs, gen-
erally following the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court;35 other state
courts have held that such programs violate the state constitution.36
Supporters of aid programs have tried to achieve one more step in the fed-
eral courts. In a variety of specialized circumstances, some states aid secular pri-
vate education but not religious private education. It was once thought that
extending these programs to include religious education would violate the fed-
eral Establishment Clause, but after Zelman, that is clearly not true. And the
Supreme Court generally says that government cannot discriminate against re-
ligion. So voucher supporters have begun to argue that states violate the Free
Exercise Clause when they fund secular private education but refuse to fund
similarly situated religious education.
The Supreme Court rejected that claim in the First case to present the ques-
tion, Locke v. Davey.37 The federal constitutional rule now appears to be that
35. Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P2d 606 (Ariz. 1999); Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203,
211-12 (Ohio 1999); Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998).
36. Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006); Witters v. State Comm'n for the Blind, 771 P.2d
1119 (Wash. 1989).
37. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
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government funding of religious schools is permitted but not required, and that
with respect to funding, government is permitted to discriminate against reli-
gion. Despite the traditional suspicion of government discretion in American
constitutional law, government now has substantial discretion to fund religious
education, or not to fund it, or even to fund it on condition that the student or the
school comply with special regulations that apply only to those who accept gov-
ernment money. In part the Court deferred to the long American tradition of
not funding religious institutions, treating that tradition as legitimate, although
not constitutionally required. In part the Court deferred to the legislature's pri-
mary responsibility for allocation of government funds. Parts of the opinion sug-
gest that its rule is confined to programs for the training of clergy; other parts of
the opinion suggest that it will apply generally to any exclusion of religious insti-
tutions from state funding programs. New cases are already pending that
present questions about the scope of Locke v. Davey.
For most of the twentieth century, this dispute over funding religious insti-
tutions was confined to schools. Religious hospitals and social service agencies
received government funds with little controversy. That has changed with re-
cent proposals for what is sometimes called "charitable choice," or in the Bush
administration, its "faith-based initiative." These proposals, only some of which
have been enacted, increased the visibility of government grants to religious
charities, and they introduced new protections for the autonomy of religious
charities accepting government funds. Agencies making grants would be for-
bidden to discriminate against religious charities; religious charities would not
have to be separately incorporated from their sponsoring churches; and religious
charities could retain their right to hire employees of their own faith even if they
accepted government funds. Some of these protections are significant changes
from traditional practice; some appear to be mostly symbolic. The proposed em-
ployment rules resolve an existing ambiguity in favor of the religious charities.
Each of these proposed changes has been politically controversial; there are con-
tinuing fights in Congress, and there is pending litigation.
Zelman and other recent cases on funding schools suggest that there is no
constitutional barrier to government funding of religious charities. But some so-
cial services may require direct grants to agencies instead of vouchers to the in-
tended beneficiaries, because legislators will be reluctant to give vouchers to
neglected children, the mentally ill, or the drug addicted, and tell them to choose
their own service providers. And these programs are not so well funded that
government can support all providers of services; government has to choose
525
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which agencies to support. So these programs may present questions of discre-
tionary direct grants to religious charities, questions that can be avoided in the
school cases. And there will certainly be litigation over the right of the religious
charity to hire persons of its own faith for government-funded positions.38
In short, the long-running American dispute over government funding of
religiously affiliated activities continues. New issues continue to emerge, and is-
sues that are settled in one forum become the subject of renewed dispute in other
forums. It is settled that the government cannot fund the core religious functions
of the church; how far that principle extends to other functions is the subject of
continuing dispute.
B. Religious Speech, With and Without Government Sponsorship
Prayer and other religious observances at government functions, and gov-
ernment displays of religious symbols, have given rise to an intense and pecu-
liarly American set of controversies. This dispute began with Protestant-
Catholic conflict over religious instruction in the public schools, and schools are
still at the heart of it, but the dispute has spread to prayer at government meet-
ings and to religious displays in city parks and on courthouse lawns.
No such issues were debated in the founding period. There was probably
more religious rhetoric in government affairs then, and many government
meetings were opened with prayer. On the other hand, gratuitous government
displays of religious symbols were probably rare, and public schools did not
exist. The nation was overwhelmingly Protestant, and the disagreements among
Protestant denominations were not great enough to make prayers by the estab-
lished clergy seriously objectionable to evangelical dissenters.
In the nineteenth century, as we have seen, Protestant religious observances
in public schools gave rise to bitter controversy between Protestants and Catho-
38. The most complete descriptions and analyses of these programs and pending proposals appear
in IRA C. Lupu & ROBERT W. Turrii, THE STATE OF THE LAW-2005: LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS AFFECT-
ING PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS (2005); IRA C. Lupu &
ROBERT W. TUTTLE, THE STATE OF THE LAw-2004: PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND
FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS (2004); IRA C. Lupu & ROBERT W. TuTTLE, THE STATE OF THE LAW-
2003: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW CONCERNING PARTNERSHIPS WITH RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
(2003); IRA C. LuPu & ROBERT W. TUTTLE, GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIPS WITH FAITH-BASED SERVICE
PROVIDERS: STATE OF THE LAW (2002). These books are all available at The Roundtable on Religion
and Social Welfare Policy, Roundtable Legal Publications, http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/
legal/]egal-publications.cfm (last visited Apr. 12, 2006).
CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES
lics. Late in the nineteenth century, a small but vocal group of secularists sought
to eliminate all government support for religion, including prayer and Bible
reading.3" Recognizing that religious observances in the schools had become di-
visive, a few state courts and local school boards began to restrict them." Reli-
gious instruction in the public schools very slowly declined over a period of
decades.
In a pair of famous decisions in 1962 and 1963, the Supreme Court held that
public schools violate the Establishment Clause when they lead students in
prayer or Bible reading.4' These decisions coincided with increasing acceptance
of Catholics and Jews as fully equal and welcomed citizens, and perhaps-this is
much harder to measure-with more of the population drifting toward secular-
ism or nominal belief. But by 1962, Protestant-Catholic tension had declined so
far that Catholics no longer objected to prayer and Bible reading in public
schools.
The school prayer decisions were unpopular and difficult to enforce. The
decisions outraged evangelical Protestants, who feel called to teach the Christian
gospel to all humans, and who feel the need to seek God's blessing and guidance
for any important activity, including education and government meetings. The
school prayer decisions were a prime contributor to the religious backlash in the
1960s and later, and to the growth of private evangelical schools. At the same
time, these decisions raised expectations among Jews and other non-Christian
religious minorities, and among nonbelievers and other secularists, that they
would no longer be subjected to government-sponsored Christian religious ob-
servances.
The result has been an escalating series of provocations and legal claims
from both sides. There have been innumerable proposals to amend the Consti-
tution to permit school-sponsored prayer, none of which has passed Congress,
and endless efforts to restore school-sponsored prayer while disguising and de-
nying government sponsorship. The Supreme Court has held that teachers can-
not invite students to lead the prayer,4 2 and that school boards cannot conduct
student elections to decide whether to have a prayer.43 The original cases in-
39. See Laycock,supra note 8, at 1683-84.
40. Early court decisions are collected in School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203,275 n.51 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
41. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203; Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
42. Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1981), affd mer., 455 U.S. 913 (1982).
43. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
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volved prayer in classrooms, but more recently the Court has invalidated prayer
at graduation and at athletic events.44 The Court has refused to invalidate prayer
at legislative sessions,45 principally because of long tradition: Congress had al-
ways opened its sessions with prayer, even in the First Congress, which had pro-
posed the Establishment Clause.
The secular side opened a second front when it began challenging
government-sponsored religious displays. The Supreme Court has held that
public schools cannot display the Ten Commandments in classrooms, 46 and that
a county cannot display a Nativity scene (a three-dimensional depiction of the
events immediately following the birth of Christ) at a central location in its
courthouse.47 But it permitted a Nativity scene displayed alongside "secular"
symbols of Christmas, such as Santa Claus, reindeer, and candy canes,48 and it
permitted a menorah (the principal symbol of the Jewish celebration of Hanuk-
kah), next to a Christmas tree and a salute-to-liberty sign.40 Most recently, the
Court decided that Texas can maintain a large granite monument displaying the
Ten Commandments on the lawn of its state capitol,5" but that two Kentucky
counties cannot display the Ten Commandments on courthouse walls, sur-
rounded by patriotic documents and a statement claiming that the Command-
ments are the foundation of the western legal tradition.5' Both decisions were 5-
4; only Justice Breyer supported both results. He approved the Texas display
mostly because it had been in place for forty years before it first aroused contro-
versy; this suggested, at least to him, that the display contained both a religious
and a secular message and that the secular message had predominated in public
perception. He joined in the Court's opinion rejecting the much more recent
Kentucky displays, in substantial part because local politicians had clearly stated
their purpose to promote Christianity.
As the facts of these cases suggest, this legal and cultural battle is beginning
to appear absurd. Each side aggressively pushes its position as far as logic will
take it; each side takes advantage of every ambiguity in the Court's opinions.
44. Id.; Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
45. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
46. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
47. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
48. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
49. Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573.
50. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005).
51. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
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The ambiguities result from the Court's unwillingness to enforce an absolute
rule. The Court has said that government cannot endorse religion or any reli-
gious teaching, but the Court will not carry that rule to its logical conclusion.
The results would be too unpopular, do too much damage to the Court's credi-
bility, and do too little good for religious minorities and nonbelievers. The Court
will not order presidents to stop issuing Thanksgiving proclamations; it will not
order the government to remove "In God We Trust" from the coins and the cur-
rency; it certainly will not order changes to all the religious place names that
Spanish friars scattered across the American Southwest, from San Francisco to
Santa Fe to Corpus Christi. The Court will not entirely ban government partic-
ipation in the nation's celebration of Christmas. But the Court cannot draw a
principled line between the modest religious statements it permits government
to make and the longer or more sectarian statements that it will not permit gov-
ernment to make.
To avoid ordering an end to government celebration of Christmas, the Su-
preme Court said that Christmas is both a religious and a secular holiday.52 The
Court said that government can celebrate the secular aspects of the holiday, and
that it would be discriminatory for government to celebrate only the secular as-
pects, so the government can mix religious and secular symbols of Christmas.
But it cannot display religious symbols alone.5' Nobody likes that compromise,
but to the Court, the alternatives seemed worse.
You can now begin to see why the two Kentucky counties claimed that the
Ten Commandments are the foundation of the western legal tradition. The
counties claimed they had displayed the Commandments for their secular legal
significance, not their religious significance. And they claimed that their display,
like the Christmas displays the Court upheld, combined religious and secular
documents. The claim that the Commandments were displayed for their secular
legal significance and not for religious reasons was undoubtedly a lie, and it was
based on an absurd reading of legal history. But the counties' real hope was that
the Court would accept their rationalizations because the Commandments
hanging on a courthouse wall might seem insignificant, not worth the inevitable
cost of hostile public reaction to a decision ordering them removed. There were
people on both sides who wished this lawsuit had never been brought-but who
52. Lynch, 465 U.S. 668.
53. Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573.
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also thought, once it was in the Supreme Court, that it was important for their
side to win.
The underlying conceptual disputes in these cases are about the scope of the
government's obligation to be neutral. Opponents of government-sponsored
prayers and religious displays say that government must be neutral as between
religion and disbelief, and that government must be neutral in all that it says,
even if no one is coerced. Some supporters of government prayers and religious
displays concede that government should be neutral as between religions, so that
government prayers and displays should refer to God only in general terms, and
should avoid the specifics of different faiths. But they deny that government has
any obligation to be neutral as between religion and disbelief. This is a modern
version of the nineteenth-century position that government should teach "non-
sectarian" religion in the public schools.
But of course many of these prayers and religious displays are not neutral as
between religions. They are mostly Christian, and they tend to reflect evangeli-
cal Protestant beliefs and sensibilities. The deeper position of people who sup-
port government prayers and religious displays is that government need be
neutral only when it exercises its coercive powers; government need not be neu-
tral in what it says. Supporters of government expressions of religious belief say
that government can promote religious belief so long as it does not punish people
who decline to participate.
The Supreme Court has rejected this position at two levels. First, the Court
says that if there is a public event that many people wish to attend for secular rea-
sons, and then someone offers a prayer at that event, persons who attend are ef-
fectively coerced to participate in the prayer.54 But that argument goes only so
far; it is hard to find coercion in the case of a passive religious display. Whether
or not there is coercion, the Court says government may not "endorse" a reli-
gious viewpoint.5 5 Government must be neutral even in what it says about reli-
gion. This argument-whether the Establishment Clause restricts government
endorsement or only government coercion-is at the heart of the dispute over
government-sponsored prayer and religious displays. It is mostly irrelevant to
other religious liberty issues.
54. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
55. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000); Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592-94;
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985).
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Those who support government prayers and religious displays are essen-
tially urging a return to toleration as the measure of religious liberty, although
they rarely argue the point in those terms. The dominant view among evangeli-
cal Christians is that minority religions and nonbelievers should be fully pro-
tected from penalties and civil disabilities, with full protection for the free
exercise of minority religions. But evangelicals also think that religion should be
included in all important government functions, that of course the religion in-
cluded will be broadly consistent with the majority's religious beliefs, and that
no one could reasonably expect otherwise. Religious dissenters do not have to at-
tend formal worship services, but if they want to attend public meetings, or send
their children to public schools, supporters of government prayer say that of
course they should have to sit through brief observances of the majority religion.
In that sense, the majority religion would be preferred and supported by govern-
ment, and all other religions would be tolerated.
Although the Supreme Court tightly restricts government-sponsored reli-
gious speech, it vigorously protects religious speech by private citizens. Religious
speakers have full rights of free speech, even in public schools or on government
property, so long as they act voluntarily and without government sponsorship.
"No government sponsorship" means they must be treated the same as other
speakers; they cannot be given special access to facilities or to audiences assem-
bled by the government. This right to religious free speech means that student
prayer clubs can meet in empty classrooms on the same terms as secular student
clubs,56 that students can urge their classmates to attend church or accept Chris-
tianity, and that religious groups-even the Pope-can hold services or offer
Mass in public parks to the same extent that secular groups can hold meetings or
rallies 7 The Court has never held, in any context, that religious speech by pri-
vate persons is subject to greater censorship or restriction because of its religious
content.
The Court's restriction of government speech about religion, and its protec-
tion of private speech about religion, have been remarkably stable and persis-
tent. But from 1994 to 2005, these two rules actually had the support of only two
justices, Kennedy and O'Connor. Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas would
have permitted significant government sponsorship of religious speech, and Jus-
56. E.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens,
496 U.S. 226 (1990).
57. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); O' Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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tices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer would have imposed significant re-
strictions on private religious speech in public places. This persistent division on
the Court enabled Kennedy and O'Connor to prevail; they generally had six
votes to prohibit government sponsorship of religious speech, and at least five
votes to invalidate government discrimination against private religious speech.
But now of course, Rehnquist and O'Connor are gone. If President Bush has ac-
complished what he hopes with his first two appointments, Kennedy may be the
new swing vote on these issues. And Kennedy had one important disagreement
with O'Connor: He distinguished government-sponsored religious displays,
which passers-by may just ignore, from government-sponsored religious exer-
cises, which often trap a captive audience and which he generally voted to strike
down. Eventually there will be more new justices, and these rules may change in
more dramatic ways, just as the rules on funding of religious activities changed.
Many of the same political forces that support government funding of reli-
gious schools also support government-sponsored prayers and religious displays.
In each of these disputes, much of the religious and conservative coalition is
aligned against the secular and liberal coalition. Why has the Court changed its
mind on funding, but not on prayers and religious displays?
The explanation again lies with Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, who see
these two sets of cases as very different. The difference is best explained in terms
of individual choice. In the funding cases, each family gets a voucher and each
family can decide where to spend that voucher. Each family can choose a religious
school or a secular school. In the private religious speech cases, each speaker can
decide what to say and each person around him can decide whether to listen. Each
student can decide whether to attend the meetings of the student prayer club.
But prayer at a government meeting, or a religious display in a government
building, requires a collective decision. Either there will be prayer for everyone
present, or a prayer for no one present. If there is a prayer, there will be only one,
and it will be in a form more consistent with some religious traditions than with
others. Either some government official must decide, or he must appoint some-
one to decide, and the person appointed will become a temporary agent of the
government for that limited purpose. Everyone at the meeting will participate
in, or at least politely sit through, the prayer that some government agent wrote
or selected. No one gets to make an individual choice about whether to pray or
how to pray.
Protecting individual choices about religion, and precluding government
choices about religion, is consistent with nearly all the concepts used to describe
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religious liberty in the United States-with separation, voluntarism, equality,
neutrality, and liberty. I think Justices Kennedy and O'Connor best imple-
mented the American conception of religious liberty by permitting vouchers,
protecting religious free speech, and restricting government prayers and reli-
gious displays. But in the current alignment of religious conflict in America,
Kennedy and O'Connor have few supporters among politicians and interest
groups. One side wants funding for private religious schools and prayer in pub-
lic schools; the other side wants neither.
C. Regulation of Religious Practice
The final set of important and contested religious liberty issues is regulation
of religious practice. In my view, this is the most fundamental and the least un-
derstood of the three sets of issues. It is most fundamental because it is only in
these cases that individuals can be threatened with civil or criminal penalties for
practicing their religion. It is least understood because the cases come in far
greater factual variety than the funding cases or the government-sponsored reli-
gious speech cases, because many of the cases arise from nonrecurring conflicts
between odd religious practices and odd regulations, because many of the vic-
tims are from small and little known religious groups and many of the burden-
some regulations are equally obscure. The press finds these cases harder to
report; the public finds it harder to take sides. But for fifteen years now, intense
disagreement over these cases has divided the Supreme Court, divided the Court
from Congress, and divided state legislatures. I will try to say enough about the
facts of each case to give you a more concrete sense of these varied disputes.
From 1963 to 1990, the Supreme Court said that when a government regu-
lation burdens a religious practice, government must either exempt the religious
practice from the regulation, or show that applying the regulation to the reli-
gious practice is necessary to serve a compelling government interest. The first
such case in the modern era was Sherbert v. Verner,5 8 which held that a state could
not refuse unemployment compensation to a Sabbatarian who lost her job be-
cause she was unavailable for work on Saturdays. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,59 the
Court held that a state could not require Amish children to attend high school
when their parents preferred to educate them on Amish farms. Educating chil-
58. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
59. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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dren might reasonably have been thought to be a compelling government inter-
est, but the Amish were willing to send their children to public school through
eighth grade, and Wisconsin required attendance only to age sixteen, which
most children reach in the middle of tenth grade. The Court found no compel-
ling advantage in that marginal increment to academic education as compared
to Amish vocational education.
Despite these decisions, the Court did not actually exempt many religious
practices from regulation. Prison and military regulations were subject to much
more deferential standards. Deferring to prison authorities, the Court held that
state prisons need not exempt Muslims from work assignments scheduled at the
same time as a weekly Muslim worship service.6" Deferring to military authori-
ties, the Court held that the Air Force did not have to allow a Jewish officer to
wear a yarmulke with his uniform.61 The Court found a compelling interest in
enforcing the military draft, so it allowed Congress to define the scope of consci-
entious objection, exempting those who objected to war in any form but not
those who distinguished between just and unjust wars.6 2 The Court found a
compelling interest in collecting taxes, so it refused to exempt Amish employers
and employees from the social security tax, even though they objected to social
insurance schemes and refused to accept social security benefits.63 The Court
found a compelling interest in prohibiting racial discrimination in education, so
it upheld a law refusing tax exemptions to private religious schools that discrim-
inated against black students.' 4
I think these findings of compelling interest were entirely plausible; in each
of these cases, there were reasons of secular self-interest to falsely claim the reli-
gious exemption, or even to genuinely convert to the religious belief that was en-
titled to the exemption. An exemption in these circumstances would thus
encourage other citizens to join the exempted religion, and it would tend to
greatly inflate the number of claims to exemption. But some commentators
think these interests were not compelling, and that these cases suggest that the
Court was not really serious about exempting religious behavior from nonessen-
tial regulation.
60. 0' Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
61. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
62. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
63. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
64. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
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In 1990, in Employment Division v. Smith," the Court changed the rule. In
Smith, the state had refused unemployment compensation to two workers who
were discharged for consuming peyote, an hallucinogenic drug, at an American
Indian religious ceremony. This ceremony, and the religion organized around it,
has been part of American Indian practice in western North America since be-
fore the European settlement. The drug is relatively safe but not absolutely so; it
has little recreational market; its religious use is associated with a decline in
abuse of alcohol and other drugs among American Indians.' These facts cast
doubt on the government's claim of compelling interest in prohibiting the peyote
religion. But in the Court's new view, none of those facts mattered.
Smith introduced an additional requirement for litigants seeking religious
exemptions: Is the law that burdens religious exercise "neutral" and "generally
applicable"? If so, the burden on religion apparently requires no justification
whatever. If not, the burden on religion is subject to the compelling interest test
as before. The Court said that Oregon's ban on peyote was neutral and generally
applicable, so it could be enforced against the Indian religious ceremony without
regard to the religious importance of the ceremony or the regulatory importance
of the law.
For convenience, call the rule from 1963 to 1990 the Sherbert rule, and call
the new rule, announced in 1990, the Smith rule. Under the Sherbert rule, the re-
ligious claimant must prove a burden on his religion; government must then
prove that it has a compelling interest in imposing that burden. Under the Smith
rule, there is a third element. The religious claimant still must prove a burden on
his religion; the court must decide whether the law imposing the burden is neu-
tral and generally applicable; and only if the law is not neutral, or not generally
applicable, must the government prove that it has a compelling interest in bur-
dening the religious practice.
Since Smith, the Supreme Court has decided only one case under the Smith
rule-a case called Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.67
Lukumi involved an Afro-Caribbean religion that sacrifices small animals,
mostly goats and chickens, to its gods. Hialeah, a Florida city near Miami, pro-
hibited the "sacrifice" of animals. The city argued that it had enacted a generally
applicable ban on sacrifice. The church argued that the ordinances were a ban
65. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
66. See Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 7-8.
67. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
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on killing animals for religious reasons, carefully drafted so as not to prohibit
any killings of animals for secular reasons. The Court unanimously agreed with
the church, holding that the ordinances were neither neutral nor generally ap-
plicable, and that they served no compelling government interest. Lukumi gives
substance to Smith's requirements of neutrality and general applicability, but the
meaning of those requirements remains sharply disputed.
Government lawyers claim that nearly every law is neutral and generally
applicable, and that the only exceptions are laws deliberately designed to single
out a religious practice. This argument has some support in the facts of Lukumi,
and some support in the language of the Smith and Lukumi opinions. Lawyers
for religious claimants say that to be "generally applicable," a law must apply to
all examples of the regulated conduct, without exceptions-or at least, with very
few exceptions. On this view, many laws fail the requirement of general applica-
bility, and thus are subject to the requirement of compelling government inter-
est. This argument has some support in the facts of Smith, more support in the
language of the Smith and Lukumi opinions, and much support in the way those
opinions explain Sherbert and other earlier cases that have not been overruled.
The Court in Smith and Lukumi distinguished these earlier cases, which means
it gave them new explanations to show that their results were consistent with the
Smith rule.
If the government lawyers are right, the Smith rule provides very little pro-
tection for religious liberty. Unless government is both hostile and clumsy, it can
find a way to prohibit religious practices without openly singling out religion for
special regulation, and thus without getting caught under the government un-
derstanding of the Smith rule. If the lawyers for religious organizations are
right, the Smith rule provides substantial protection for religious liberty, but that
protection is less inclusive, more complicated, and harder to invoke than the
protection of the Sherbert rule. Either way, religious liberty is less protected
under Smith than under Sherbert.
This reduction in protection for religious liberty provoked widespread dis-
agreement among other branches and levels of government. Congress enacted
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act68 (RFRA) in an attempt to restore the
Sherbert rule as a matter of statutory right.
68. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2000),amended
by Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5
(2000).
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The Supreme Court held RFRA, as applied-to the states, invalid as beyond
the powers delegated to Congress.69 But RFRA remains in effect as applied to
the federal government, 7 and Congress has actually strengthened it.7' The first
Supreme Court case interpreting RFRA gave the statute full and vigorous
scope. 72 The case involved religious use of hoasca, a tea brewed from two Brazil-
ian plants and containing small quantities of a hallucinogenic drug prohibited
by the Controlled Substances Act. The tea has effects similar to those of peyote.
RFRA expressly puts on government the burden of proving its compelling in-
terest in individual applications of federal law to religious practice. The Court
unanimously held that the government had not carried its burden, and it unan-
imously rejected the government's claim that it need only point to Congressional
fact finding in the course of enacting the Controlled Substances Act. The gov-
ernment's interpretation would have nullified RFRA's allocation of the burden
of proof; the Court's holding makes RFRA an important protection for religious
liberty.
Thirteen states have adopted state RFRAs, and at least another twelve
states-arguably as many as seventeen states-have interpreted their state con-
stitutions in ways more consistent with the Sherbert rule than with the Smith
rule. 7' So in one way or another, a majority of states have rejected the Smith rule.
But there has been remarkably little state-court litigation under these provi-
sions, so the seriousness of state commitment to the Sherbert rule has not yet been
tested.
Most recently, Congress enacted the Religious Land Use and Institutional-
ized Persons Act (RLUIPA).74 RLUIPA protects churches against local zoning
laws that often make it difficult for new churches to buy or rent a place of worship.
It applies only when the real estate transaction would affect interstate commerce,
or when the zoning law is administered in an individualized rather than a gener-
69. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
70. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998).
71. The exercise of religion protected by RFRA is defined to include "any exercise of religion,
whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5( 7 )
(2000); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4) (2000).
72. Gonzalez v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211 (2006).
73. These state laws and decisions are collected in Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the
Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV.
L. Rzv. 155,211-12 (2004).
74. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-
5(2000).
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ally applicable way. These restrictions on the application of RLUIPA are designed
to confine the law's scope to specific delegations of power to Congress, and thus to
avoid the excessive scope of regulation that led to invalidation of RFRA. RLUIPA
also protects the free exercise rights of prisoners in state prisons that accept federal
funds. State officials have bitterly resisted RLUIPA. The Supreme Court has
unanimously rejected a claim that the prison provisions violate the Establishment
Clause by giving preferred treatment to religion;75 states are also arguing in the
lower courts, mostly unsuccessfully, that both the prison and the land use provi-
sions exceed the scope of powers delegated to Congress. RFRA, RLUIPA, and
other legislative enactments to protect the free exercise of religion 76 reveal the
depth of disagreement on issues of regulating religious practice.
I have emphasized the ambiguity of Smith's requirement that laws regulat-
ing religion be "generally applicable," but in some applications, the meaning of
that phrase is clear. A recent French example makes a helpful illustration. My
point here is not to evaluate the French law, but to use this much-publicized
French example to illustrate the relevant American concepts.
The new French law that prohibits students from wearing conspicuous re-
ligious items in public schools would not be a generally applicable law in the
United States, even though it applies to all religions. It does not single out Mus-
lims, or scarves or veils. But it singles out religious behavior and regulates that
behavior because it is religious, without regulating equivalent secular behavior.
If I understand the law correctly, a student can wear conspicuous secular jewelry
but not conspicuous religious jewelry; a student can wear a scarf as a fashion
statement but not as a religious statement. Despite intense disagreement on reg-
ulation of religious practice in the United States, this law is beyond the range of
the American debate. I think that all informed American lawyers would say this
law singles out religion and is not generally applicable.
Such a law might still be justified as serving a compelling government inter-
est, but when a law openly discriminates against religion, the compelling interest
test is hard to satisfy. A compelling interest in regulating only religion would
normally mean the need to prevent some imminent and tangible harm. Creating
75. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
76. See American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 1996a
(2000); Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-183
(codified as amended at II U.S.C. §§ 544, 546, 548, 707, 1325) (protecting churches and other char-
ities from most claims of creditors of persons who contributed to the charity and subsequently
went bankrupt).
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or preserving a more secular environment would not be a compelling interest;
probably, in the American view of these issues, it is not even a legitimate interest.
Accelerating the assimilation of Muslims might be compelling if assimilation is
essential to addressing the problem of terrorism. But the usual response of
American constitutional law to such problems is to punish individuals who vio-
late the law, and not try to control large groups that contain some terrorists and
many innocent people. And certainly courts would doubt whether the law will
actually accelerate assimilation; it may just drive Muslim girls out of public
schools. Protecting young Muslim women from coercion by their parents is an
interest of doubtful legitimacy for minors; for adult women, it would require
clear evidence that coercion is a widespread problem. I think the law would not
serve compelling interests by American standards. But the compelling interest
test is malleable and poorly defined; an American judge inclined to uphold such
a law might persuade himself that one or more of these interests is compelling.
Finally, some American lawyers would argue that the law does not substan-
tially burden religion, because it permits students to wear religious symbols that
are inconspicuous. Some American judges seem to believe that government does
not burden religion unless it interferes with a religious practice that is compul-
sory in the claimant's faith tradition. A Christian student wearing a large cross
might be viewed as having made an individual choice, not mandated by her re-
ligion, so that limiting her to a small cross would not be a burden on her reli-
gion.77 This is a minority view in the United States; the Supreme Court's cases
tend to the view that any religiously motivated behavior is an exercise of reli-
gion. 78 But this disagreement would likely not matter with respect to yarmulkes
or Muslim scarves; most students who wear one of these would say that their re-
ligion requires it, and that any interference with this religious obligation is a sub-
stantial burden on their exercise of religion.
The underlying American argument over regulating religious behavior in-
volves multiple issues, and the two sides only partly correspond to the two sides
in the cases on government funding and government-sponsored religious
speech. Supporters of the Smith rule tend to think that neutrality is the funda-
mental principle in religious liberty cases, and by neutrality, they mean formal
neutrality. Supporters of the Sherbert rule tend to think that liberty is the funda-
mental principle, or that neutrality should be understood as substantive neutral-
77. See Warner v. City of Boca Raton, 887 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 2004).
78. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
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ity, which brings neutrality more in line with liberty. From the perspective of the
claimants in Smith and Lukumi, whose central religious rituals were subject to
criminal penalties, it matters little whether the law was neutral and generally
applicable. What matters is that it suppressed their religious liberty, and sup-
porters of the Sherbert rule think that government should not do that without a
very good reason.
Religious conservatives tend to support the Sherbert rule, because it better
protects religious liberty. Secular conservatives tend to support the Smith rule,
because it better preserves social order, it reduces the occasions for judges to in-
validate laws on behalf of dissenters and minorities, and it saves judges from
having to balance competing interests. Many secular liberals support the Sherbert
rule, because it better protects individual liberty. But some support the Smith
rule, because they see religion as a generally conservative cause in the United
States, and because they think the Sherbert rule discriminates against nonbeliev-
ers. A religious conscientious objector to a law may get exempted under the
Sherbert rule; a secular conscientious objector usually will not. During the Viet-
nam War, the Court interpreted the military conscientious objection statute to
protect deeply held conscientious beliefs that lacked a conventional religious ba-
sis, 79 and that approach goes far to solve the problem of discriminating against
secular conscience. But it aggravates the fears of disorder, of excessive judicial
intervention, and of difficult judicial decisionmaking. Current American judges
are unlikely to protect secular conscience under statutes or constitutional provi-
sions protecting the free exercise of religion. Realistically, the current struggle is
over whether and to what extent they will protect the exercise of religion as reli-
gion has traditionally been understood.
CONCLUSION
Americans agree that government should not penalize any belief about reli-
gion, and that government should not pay for core religious functions. Beyond
that, the United States has competing conceptions of religious liberty. Simplify-
ing very greatly in order to summarize, one broad coalition would have govern-
ment give nondiscriminatory financial support to religious schools and charities,
give verbal support to mainstream religious faith, and regulate religiously moti-
vated behavior only when absolutely necessary. An opposing coalition would
79. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
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permit no government money for any religiously affiliated activity, would per-
mit no government statements for or against religion, and would regulate reli-
gious behavior on substantially the same terms as nonreligious behavior. Each
side is winning on some issues, losing on others. These coalitions are shifting and
overlapping; important allies on one of these issues are often opponents on an-
other. I examine all three sets of issues in greater depth in a recent article.8"
I have emphasized the arguments in American law, and not just the rules.
The arguments will persist; the rules are not so stable. Justices of the Supreme
Court age, retire, and die; new justices will be appointed. The Court is deeply di-
vided on all three sets of contested issues. The rules on funding religious institu-
tions and regulating religious practice have changed in important ways in the
last twenty years. The rules on religious speech have been more stable, but as I
explained, those rules had the support of only two justices and now face an un-
certain future.
American judges are not career employees in a specially trained branch of
the civil service; federal judges are appointed by the president and confirmed by
the Senate. In the short run, the American judiciary is insulated from politics.
But in the long run, if an issue arouses intense and sustained public interest, the
Supreme Court eventually responds to large changes in public opinion. So the
arguments will continue, and the rules may change. But if you -understand the
arguments, you will be able to understand the changes in the rules.
80. Laycock,supra note 73.

